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  This paper empirically examines the benefits of relationship banking to banks, in the 
context of consumer credit markets. Using a unique panel dataset that contains comprehensive 
information about the relationships between a large bank and its credit card customers, we 
estimate the effects of relationship banking on the customers’ default, attrition, and utilization 
behavior. We find that relationship accounts exhibit lower probabilities of default and attrition, 
and have higher utilization rates, compared to non-relationship accounts, ceteris paribus. Such 
effects become more pronounced with increases in various measures of the strength of the 
relationships, such as relationship breadth, depth, length, and proximity. Moreover, dynamic 
information about changes in the behavior of a customer’s other accounts at the bank, such as 
changes in checking and savings balances, helps predict and thus monitor the behavior of the 
credit card account over time. These results imply significant potential benefits of relationship 
banking to banks in the retail credit market.  
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1.   Introduction 
According to recent theories of financial intermediation, one of the main roles of a bank 
is serving as a relationship lender.
1 As a bank provides more services to a customer, it creates a 
stronger relationship with the customer and gains more private information about him or her. 
Such relationships can potentially benefit both banks and their customers. For instance, 
relationship banking can help banks in monitoring the default risk of borrowers, providing the 
banks with a comparative advantage in lending. Relationship banking can also lower banks’ cost 
of information gathering over multiple products.  Depending on the competitiveness of the 
banking sector, such benefits to banks can lead to increased credit supply to customers, through 
either greater quantities and/or lower prices of credit (e.g., Boot and Thakor, 1994).
2  
Empirical studies of the benefits of the relationship banking have largely focused on the 
benefits to customers, corporate customers in particular. Early studies documented that the 
existence of a bank relationship increases the value of a firm (e.g., Billett et al., 1985; Slovin et 
al., 1993). Subsequent studies have sought to measure the effects of relationships on credit 
supply to firms. These studies have emphasized different aspects of relationships, such as their 
breadth (e.g., number of services provided), depth, length, and proximity. However, the results of 
the studies have been mixed. For example, Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that relationship 
lending affects the quantity of credit more than the price, while other studies find that customers 
get either lower future contract prices (e.g., Burger and Udell, 1995; Chakravarty and Scott, 
1999) or higher future contract prices (e.g., Ongena and Smith, 2002).   
                                                           
1 Boot (2000) provides an excellent review of the literature on relationship banking. 
2 There can also be costs to relationship lending. For example, it can potentially create a “soft budget-constraint” 
problem, in which the customer exploits the relationship in bad times (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; and Bolton 
and Scharfstein, 1996).  Or, relationship lending can potentially create a hold-up problem, providing a bank with an 
information monopoly that could allow it to price contracts at non-competitive terms (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; 
and Wilson, 1993).    2
There has been limited empirical research on the underlying benefits of relationships to 
banks.
3 One exception is Mester, Nakamura, and Renault (2005), who use a sample of 100 
Canadian small-business borrowers to investigate the benefits of particular relationship 
information in monitoring the risk of corporate loans. They find that information about 
customers’ collateral, in particular their inventory and accounts receivable, which might not be 
available to banks outside of a relationship, is useful for loan monitoring. Also, changes in 
transaction account balances are informative about changes in this collateral.  
While the above studies analyze relationship banking in the context of firm-lender 
relationships, it can also potentially matter for consumer-lender relationships. Using the Survey 
of Consumer Finance [SCF], Chakravarty and Scott (1999) conclude that relationship lending 
not only lowers the probability of credit rationing but also lowers the price of credit for consumer 
loans. While this study provides evidence that banks pass on some the benefits of relationship 
lending to consumers, it does not directly measure the underlying benefit to the banks in the first 
place. We fill this gap in the literature by analyzing the economic benefits of relationship 
banking to banks, in the context of retail banking. 
Credit cards provide a good setting for analyzing retail relationship banking. Credit cards 
are consumers’ most important source of unsecured credit, in addition to being one of the most 
important means of payment. By the late 1990s, almost three-fourths of U.S. households had at 
least one credit card, and of these households about three-fifths were borrowing on their cards 
(1998 SCF). Aggregate credit card balances are large, currently amounting to about $900 billion 
(Federal Reserve Board 2007).   
                                                           
3 The review by Boot (2000) concludes that “existing empirical work is virtually silent on identifying the precise 
sources of value in relationship banking.”   3
One important advantage of studying the credit card market, as opposed to most other 
credit markets, is that it is easier to identify the information actually used by credit card issuers in 
managing their accounts. This is because the issuers rely on “hard” information. Since they have 
millions of accounts to manage, the issuers use automated decision rules that are functions of a 
given set of variables. A special feature of our dataset is that it contains the variables used to 
manage the credit card accounts in our sample. While different issuers can use somewhat 
different sets of such variables, issuers generally rely very heavily on credit-risk scores (e.g., 
Moore, 1996). The scores can be thought of as the issuers’ own summary statistics for the default 
risk and profitability of each account. As we discuss below, there are two main types of scores, 
based on different sets of information available to the issuers, both public and private. Hence we 
can use the scores to conveniently summarize the public and private information traditionally 
used by credit card issuers.  
Such comprehensive summaries of banks’ information have not been available in 
previous studies of bank lending, especially in markets where unobserved “soft” information can 
be important. Given the information used by banks to manage their accounts, we can more 
cleanly test whether additional information, in this case relationship information, provides 
additional predictive power.  
Specifically, we examine the implications of bank relationships for key aspects of credit 
card behavior, such as default, attrition and utilization rates. We use a unique, representative 
dataset of about a hundred thousand credit card accounts, linked to information about the other 
relationships that the account-holders have with the bank that issued their credit card accounts. 
Previous studies (Gross and Souleles, 2002) have analyzed the usefulness of other, non-
relationship types of information in predicting consumer default, including macroeconomic and   4
geographic-average demographic variables, “public” credit bureau information that is available 
to all potential lenders, and lenders’ “private” within-account (as opposed to across-account) 
information about the past behavior of the accounts at issue. The key contribution of this study is 
to use cross-account relationship information, to test whether a bank’s private information 
regarding the behavior of the other accounts held by a customer at the bank provides additional 
predictive power regarding the account at issue. Since our dataset samples credit card accounts, 
we focus on predicting credit card behavior.  
The cross-account relationship information that we use is rich and comprehensive. It 
includes measures of the breadth of the relationships (number of relationships), the types of 
relationships (e.g., deposit, investment, and loan accounts), the length of the relationships (age in 
months), the proximity of the relationships (distance from a branch), and the depth of the 
relationships (balances in dollars).  
The previous corporate literature has discussed a number of different explanations as to 
why such relationship information could be informative, but it is difficult to empirically 
distinguish between these explanations. Some explanations tend to emphasize what can roughly 
be thought of as selection mechanisms. For example, when considering loan applications, banks 
might be better at screening applications from existing relationship customers. Or, perhaps 
customers with multiple relationships are different in otherwise-hard-to-observe ways than non-
relationship customers. (E.g., relationship customers might be wealthier or more sophisticated, or 
might face larger costs of switching to another lender.)  By contrast, other explanations in the 
literature tend to emphasize more dynamic mechanisms related to information production over 
time and the ongoing monitoring of loans. While multiple explanations might simultaneously be 
at work, we will consider some relationship information that is inherently dynamic, such as high-  5
frequency changes in the level and in the volatility of the balances in other relationships. That is, 
are there informational benefits to monitoring such relationship balances over time? Such 
dynamic relationship information has not generally been available in the previous literature. 
While dynamic information is potentially available from any relationship, some authors have 
noted the potential value of checking relationships in particular (e.g. Black 1975, Fama 1985). 
Accordingly, we consider extensions regarding checking balances, such as the implications of 
very low checking balances and of recent transfers in and out of checking.  
Our data allows us to estimate some of the most important potential benefits of 
relationship information to retail banks. First, we examine if the various measures of 
relationships can help banks better predict the default behavior of credit card accounts. Second, 
we also examine the implications of relationships for attrition and utilization rates. To our 
knowledge, this is the first comprehensive analysis of relationships in the retail banking market. 
Previewing the main results, we find substantial potential benefits from relationship 
lending, through lower default risk, lower attrition, and increased utilization. Using Cox 
proportional hazard models, the relationship information is found to significantly help predict 
default and attrition, above and beyond all the other variables used by the bank – both public 
information and private non-relationship information based only on the behavior of the credit 
card account. For example, for credit card accounts with at least one other relationship with the 
bank, the marginal probabilities of default and attrition are about 10% and 12% lower than those 
of accounts without other relationships, ceteris paribus.  More generally, the benefits to the bank 
tend to increase with various measures of the strength of the relationships, including measures 
analogous to those used in the prior corporate literature, such as relationship breadth, depth, 
length, and proximity. Further, explicitly dynamic information about changes in the behavior of   6
the account-holders’ other relationships at the bank, such as changes in checking and savings 
balances, help predict the behavior of the credit card account over time. This suggests that one 
important advantage of relationships, among the various other advantages that have been 
discussed in the literature, is that they can help improve the monitoring of borrowers over time. 
Also, we find that relationship banking is associated with higher utilization rates. For instance, 
relationship accounts have a 7 percentage point higher utilization rate compared to non-
relationship accounts, ceteris paribus.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 
3 discusses the empirical methodology and results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.   Data  
We use a unique, proprietary panel dataset of credit card accounts, with associated 
relationship information, from a large, national financial institution. The dataset contains a 
representative sample of about a hundred thousand accounts open as of October 2001, followed 
monthly for the next 24 months.  
The dataset includes the key information used by the bank in managing its credit card 
accounts. The dataset contains the main billing information listed on each account's monthly 
statement, including total payments, spending, balances, and debt, as well as the credit limit and 
APR.  
The dataset also includes the two key credit-risk scores for each account, which are 
lenders’ traditional summary statistics for the risk and profitability of the account. The “external” 
credit score (the industry-standard FICO score) is estimated based on the credit bureau data 
available for each consumer. While the credit bureaus contain some information about the full   7
range of a consumer’s credit relationships, across all lenders, the individual lenders report only a 
subset of their own information about each relationship to the bureaus. The external scores 
summarize this “public” information, which is available to all potential lenders. The “internal” 
credit score is estimated by the lenders using their private, in-house information. Traditionally 
(and true for our sample), that information has been limited to the behavior of the individual 
account in question -- here the sample credit card accounts -- not the other accounts or 
relationships the account-holder has at the same bank.  Thus the two scores conveniently 
summarize the non-relationship (private within-account and public) information used by banks in 
managing credit cards.     
In addition to the external credit score, the dataset also includes the subset of the 
underlying credit bureau information that the bank directly collected from the credit bureaus: the 
total number of bankcards held by the account-holder, across all lenders, and the balances and 
limits on those cards; the number and balances on other, non-bank credit cards (such as store 
cards); total balances and limits on home equity lines of credit (Helocs); total mortgage balances 
(including both first and second mortgages); and total balances on student loans and auto loans. 
The credit bureau variables are updated quarterly.   
This data has been augmented with a number of other data sources. First, and most 
importantly for our purposes, the dataset was linked to a systematic summary of the other 
accounts the credit card account-holders have at the bank. Specifically, we have information 
about the following types of deposit, investment, and loan relationships: checking; savings; 
CD’s; mutual funds; brokerage; mortgages; home equity loans (second mortgages); and home   8
equity lines of credit.
4 For each relationship type, we know the length of the relationship (age in 
months) and the depth of the relationship (balances in dollars). This relationship information is 
updated monthly over the sample period.
5 
Second, this credit data is also augmented with macroeconomic and geographic-average 
demographic information based on each account-holder’s location, including: the state 
unemployment rate, average state income, the fraction of people in the state lacking healthcare 
coverage, and local house prices.
6 Some of these variables are updated monthly while others are 
updated annually. The dataset also includes the self-reported level of account-holder income 
when available from the account application
7, as well as an account-holder specific estimate of 
wealth (based on marketing/geographic data, and coded as “high”, “medium”, or “low”) as of the 
time of the origination of the account.  
The sample includes credit card accounts that were open as of the start of the sample 
period in October 2001.
8 To focus on the effects of relationships and minimize any potential 
endogeneity, for credit card account-holders with other relationships, in the reported results we 
require that these other relationships have been opened before the credit card account; that is, we 
exclude account-holders that initiated new relationships within our sample period subsequent to 
opening the credit card account.   
                                                           
4 The dataset does not include a few smaller relationships, such as student loans, personal loans, and auto loans. 
Thus our results represent a lower bound on the total possible value of relationships, though some of this 
information (student and auto loans) will be partly captured by the credit bureau data that we use.  
5 The exception is that balances information is not available for brokerage accounts.  
6 We use the OFHEO MSA-level house prices when available; otherwise we use the state average prices. In 
preliminary work, we also considered additional variables, such as the state divorce rate (which however is not 
available for some states, such as California) and the bankruptcy exemption levels in the state (which are subsumed 
by our state dummies).   
7 This income variable is available for slightly under half of the accounts. To avoid reducing the sample size, we 
include a dummy variable indicating when application income is missing, and in those cases set the value of income 
to zero.  
8 That is, accounts that are closed at the start of the sample, due to attrition or default, have been excluded. 
Furthermore, to simplify the hazard analysis of account age, in the reported results we focus on accounts originated 
after October 1999.    9
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the key variables used below, averaged over the 
two years of the sample period. The table distinguishes “relationship accounts,” which have at 
least one other relationship (56% of the sample), and “non-relationship accounts,” which have no 
other relationships (44%). The relationship account-holders have higher income and higher 
wealth on average. They also have less debt on their account and higher internal and external 
credit scores. Overall, based on the public and private within-account information, the 
relationship accounts generally appear to be less risky than the non-relationship accounts. (The 
credit scores are calibrated such that higher scores correspond to lower probabilities of default.) 
Consistently, the relationship accounts received higher credit limits and lower APRs. Turning to 
their performance over the sample period, the relationship accounts do in fact have lower default 
rates, and also lower attrition rates and higher utilization rates, on average. The open question is 
whether these results can be explained by the differences in their other (non-relationship) 
characteristics, as opposed to their relationships.  
  The next section undertakes a multivariate analysis of the accounts’ behavior, 
emphasizing the role of the private, cross-account relationship variables, conditional on 
controlling for the other characteristics like the credit scores.  
 
3.  Empirical Results 
3.1   Relationship Banking and Credit Card Default and Attrition 
3.1.1 Methodology 
To test if relationship banking can help banks in assessing the default and attrition risk of 
credit card loans, we estimate Cox proportional hazard models for default and for attrition.
9 We 
use a standard industry definition of default as going bankrupt or three months delinquent,   10
whichever comes first (e.g., as in Gross and Souleles, 2002). Attrition is based on account 
closing without default. 
The Cox model allows for a non-parametric baseline hazard rate as well as potentially 
time-varying explanatory variables.  We estimate specifications of the following form:  
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where Yi,t is a dummy variable indicating whether account i defaulted (or attrited) in month t.  
We group the main explanatory variables into six categories: Timet represents a complete 
set of month dummies, one for each month in the sample period. StateDummiesi  represents a set 
of dummy variables corresponding to the state in which account-holder i lives. MacroDemogi,t-6 
represents the macroeconomic and demographic characteristics, such as the local unemployment 
rate, plus the account-holder specific estimates of income and wealth. LoanPerformancei,t-6 
includes the internal measures of the performance of the sample credit card account over the 
sample period, including monthly purchases, payments, and debt, and the credit limit, interest 
rate, and internal credit-risk score.
 CreditBureaui,t-6 represents the external credit score and the 
other variables from the credit bureaus, such as total balances on credit cards, Helocs, and 
mortgages.
10  
Such variables have been studied before. Using related duration models, Gross and 
Souleles (2002) show that the external scores are very powerful predictors of consumer default. 
Even given these scores, the internal scores are also very powerful predictors, which implies that 
credit card issuers’ private within-account information is valuable. Nonetheless, even given the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
9 We also estimated the baseline results using a multinomial logit model, and the results were qualitatively similar. 
10 Unless stated otherwise, the time-varying variables in MacroDemog,  LoanPerformance,  CreditBureau, and 
Relationship are generally lagged by six months to minimize endogeneity, as in Gross and Souleles (2002). For 
instance, by the time an account is already three months delinquent, its credit score would have already severely 
deteriorated, creating essentially a mechanical relationship with the dependent variable.    11
two scores, macroeconomic and demographic characteristics are also predictive, albeit less so 
quantitatively. This result suggests that lenders do not necessarily use all potentially available 
information (perhaps due to regulatory or reputational concerns).  
The key innovation of this study comes in assessing the incremental predictive power of 
Relationship, which represents a broad array of measures of the account-holders’ relationships. 
The baseline relationship measure labeled R1 simply uses a dummy variable to identify the credit 
card account-holders who have at least one other relationship at the bank at origination. (The 
omitted, baseline category is non-relationship accounts). R2 measures the breadth of the 
relationship, using dummy variables for the number of relationships (1 to 6+, omitting 0 
relationships). R3 focuses on the types of relationship, grouping the relationships into three 
broad categories (again using dummy variables):  deposit relationships, investment relationships, 
and loan relationships. R4 identifies the types of relationships more finely (8 categories): 
checking and savings accounts (deposit relationships); CDs, brokerage, and mutual fund 
accounts (investment relationships); and mortgages, home equity loans, and home equity lines 
(loan relationships). R5 measures the length of the relationships (age in months since opening), 
for each of the eight relationship categories separately. R6 focuses on the proximity of the 
relationship, using interacted dummy variables to distinguish account-holders that have a 
relationship and reside in states with bank branches. R7 measures the depth of the relationships 
by the balances of each of the relationship categories (in addition to controlling for the presence 
of each relationship as in R4). R8 combines the previous measures simultaneously.  
To try to distinguish more specifically the potential benefits of relationships in the 
ongoing monitoring of loans, we also consider more dynamic relationship information 
(controlling for the level and presence of balances using R4 and R7). R9 considers the effect of   12
changes in the various types of balances (for convenience, between months t-6 and t-5). R10 
considers the volatility of balances. (In light of the available sample period, it uses the standard 
deviation between t-1 and t-12.) R11 uses instead the change in the volatility of balances (the 
standard deviation between t-1 and t-6, minus the standard deviation between t-7 and t-12). R12 
focuses more specifically on checking balances, using an indicator for whether these balances 
have fallen below $2000. R13 uses instead indicator variables for whether there were matching 
balance transfers between the checking account and the other accounts.  
In all specifications, the standard errors are clustered to adjust for heteroscedasticity 
across accounts and serial correlation within accounts.  
 
3.1.2  Results   
We first show how the baseline hazard rates from the Cox model vary with the number of 
relationships, without controlling for other covariates. Figure 1a shows the associated survival 
curves for (lack of) default. The survival curves are monotonically increasing with the number of 
relationships. For example, for accounts with just one other relationship, the probability of not 
defaulting within 48 months is about 96%. But for accounts with six or more relationships, that 
probability significantly rises, to about 99%. Conversely, the probability of default 
monotonically declines with the number of relationships. Figure 1b shows the analogous survival 
curves for (lack of) attrition. Again, the curves substantially and monotonically increase with the 
number of relationships. 
We now estimate the full multivariate Cox model, following equation (1), first for 
default. We begin by briefly discussing the results for the non-relationship variables, for our 
baseline specification R1 (for brevity, reported in Appendix Table 1). Starting with the credit 
variables, the external and internal scores have negative and significant coefficients. As   13
expected, higher scores are predictive of lower probabilities of default. The marginal effects for 
continuous covariates like the scores show the effects of a one standard-deviation increase in the 
covariates. A one standard-deviation larger external (internal) score is associated with a 15% 
(16%) reduction in the probability of credit card default relative to the baseline default rate, 
ceteris paribus. These are economically significant effects.  
Many of the other credit variables are also significant, though their marginal effects are 
much smaller. The probability of default significantly increases with the amount of debt on the 
credit card account. It also increases with the total number of credit cards held by the account-
holder (both bankcard and non-bankcard), and the balances on those cards. A larger credit limit 
or a lower APR on the account is associated with a lower probability of default. As discussed in 
the prior literature, this likely reflects the endogeneity of credit supply: on average issuers 
extended better credit terms to borrowers that were less risky. Hence the results for such 
covariates should not be interpreted as causal. For our purposes it is conservative to control for 
such variables, since they are in the issuer’s (non-relationship) information set. Similarly for 
Helocs, where one can also distinguish credit demand (balances) and credit supply (credit limits), 
larger balances are associated with more default, but larger limits are associated with less default. 
Other credit balances where one cannot so readily distinguish credit supply and demand, such as 
mortgage balances, have overall negative coefficients. In sum, the public information from the 
credit bureaus is predictive of default, and even given this information the bank’s private within-
account information is also predictive.  
Turning to the macroeconomic-demographic variables, adverse local economic 
conditions are generally associated with more default. Higher local unemployment and lower 
house price growth are associated with significantly higher default rates, even given the state and   14
month dummies.  A one standard-deviation increase in unemployment (decrease in house price 
growth rates) corresponds to a 3% increase (8% increase) in the probability of default. Higher 
income and wealth are associated with less default, though these results are not statistically 
significant. (This could reflect measurement error in these estimates of income and wealth. 
“Low-doc” accounts, for which income was not collected at the time of application, have 
significantly higher default rates.) Overall, these (non-relationship) results are generally 
consistent with prior research  (Gross and Souleles, 2002).  
We now focus on the results for the relationship information. The baseline relationship 
measure R1 simply uses an indicator variable for having another relationship. The omitted group 
is non-relationship accounts. The relationship variable has a significant negative coefficient. This 
implies that relationship accounts have a lower probability of default than non-relationship 
accounts, ceteris paribus. According to the marginal effect, the probability of default is 10% 
lower on average. This is an economically significant effect (and larger than the marginal effects 
of all the other covariates apart from the credit scores). Given the rich set of covariates, including 
both the public information and private within-account information of the issuer, this result 
demonstrates the predictive value of cross-account relationship information.   
  Table 2 considers the other measures of relationships.  Each horizontal panel in the table 
shows the results from the Cox model for separate specifications using each of the relationship 
measures R1 to R13 separately. (For brevity, only the relationship results are reported. For 
reference, the table repeats the results for R1.) R2 measures relationship breadth according to the 
number of relationships. As in Figure 1, the probability of default significantly and 
monotonically declines with the number of relationships. According to the marginal effects, the   15
probability of default decreases by 2% for the first relationship, and by 18% for the sixth (or 
more) relationship.   
Relationship measure R3 considers the effects of different types of relationships. The 
presence of each of the three broad relationship types is associated with lower probabilities of 
default. The magnitude of the effect is largest for investment relationships. The probability of 
default decreases by 14% with investments relationships, versus 9% for deposit relationships and 
4% for loan relationships. R4 uses a finer partition of the relationship types. Within investment 
accounts, CD relationships have the largest (negative) marginal effects. All the other relationship 
types also have significant, albeit smaller, negative effects.  
Measure R5 focuses on the length of the other relationships (age in months, distinct from 
the age of the credit card account which is separately taken into account in the Cox model). For 
each relationship type, the probability of default significantly declines with the age of the 
relationship. The marginal effects range in size from 3% to 13% declines (for a one standard-
deviation increase in age), with the largest effect arising from the age of a CD relationship.     
R6 focuses on the proximity of the relationship, using an indicator for account-holders 
that reside in states with bank branches, and the interaction of this variable with the indicator 
(R1) for having a relationship.
11  The interaction term is significantly negative. This implies that 
the (negative) effect of relationships on default risk is stronger when account-holders reside 
closer to branches. Thus, even given the other controls for local conditions, proximity to the bank 
matters (as in Petersen and Rajan, 2002). 
R7 focuses instead on relationship depth, using ln(balances + $1). (The specification also 
includes the indicator variables for having the corresponding relationship, as in R4.) For all 
                                                           
11 This specification requires dropping the state dummies in equation (1). Accordingly we focus on the interaction 
term, not the non-interacted indicator for proximity.    16
relationships, larger balances at the bank are associated with smaller probabilities of default. For 
asset balances, the marginal effects range from 7% to 20%. The marginal effects are much 
smaller in magnitude for credit balances, though still negative. Recall that the specification 
controls for total credit balances for each of the credit relationship types using the credit bureau 
data, as well as (a more coarse measure of) wealth. Hence, these results can be interpreted as 
indicating that the larger the share of an account-holder’s various balances at this particular 
bank, the lower the probability of default on the credit card from the bank.  
R8 considers simultaneously the previous measures of relationship, specifically 
relationship breadth, type, length, proximity, and depth. Not surprisingly, the marginal effects are 
often smaller, but nonetheless the general pattern of results is similar to that above. All of the 
relationship measures retain their significant negative coefficients.  
 Overall, under all the measures of relationship R1-R7, relationship accounts have lower 
probabilities of default. Similar measures of relationships have been considered in the previous 
literature on corporate lending. To try to distinguish the specifically dynamic notions of the 
benefits of relationships, the subsequent specifications consider more explicitly dynamic 
measures of relationship information.  
Relationship measure R9 focuses on the change in relationship balances (in addition to 
the level of balances from R7 and the indicators from R4).
12 The specification also includes the 
corresponding changes in the external and internal credit scores. Increases in the scores have 
negative, statistically and economically significant effects. As expected, upwards revisions in the 
scores reflect the arrival of information indicating a reduction in default risk. Even controlling 
                                                           
12 Since our sample excludes relationships opened subsequent to the credit card account, these results are driven by 
changes in the intensive margin of balances. R9 does not include the (high-frequency) changes in the CD and 
mortgage and home equity loan balances, since these mostly reflect interest and regular amortization, and so are a 
priori not as informative.    17
for this, the changes in balances also have significant negative coefficients. Thus increases over 
time in relationship balances are associated with declines in default risk, ceteris paribus. The 
marginal effects are substantial, ranging from 6%-13% declines. These results show the value of 
relationships specifically in the ongoing monitoring of loans.  
R10 measures the volatility of balances, across the prior 12 months. The specification 
also includes the volatility of the credit scores. Accounts with more volatile scores have higher 
probabilities of default (consistent with Musto and Souleles, 2006). In addition, more volatile 
relationship balances are also associated with higher default risk, with the marginal effects 
ranging between 5% - 12%. R11 considers instead the change in the volatility of the balances, 
over the prior two six-month periods. The coefficients are again significantly positive. Increases 
in volatility are also associated with higher default risk.  
The remaining relationship measures focus on checking balances in particular. R12 uses 
an indicator for whether checking balances fall to a low level, here below $2000. Since the 
specification also includes the overall level of checking balances (R7), this indicator reflects the 
discrete increase in risk associated with low balances per se. The estimated coefficient is 
significantly positive. Low checking balances are associated with a 13% marginal increase in the 
probability of default.  Finally, R13 uses an indicator that identifies matching balance transfers 
between the checking account and the other accounts. The first indicator identifies whether 
balances were moved to checking from the other accounts. The coefficient is significantly 
positive. Further analysis shows that this result is driven mostly by transfers from the savings and 
investment accounts. Thus, when account-holders appear to dissave, the probability of default is 
higher. This is consistent with their having faced a negative shock. Conversely, the negative 
coefficient on the second indicator implies that when account-holders save, transferring balances   18
from checking to the other accounts, the probability of default is lower. This is consistent with a 
positive shock. The marginal effect is much larger for dissaving, implying a 13% increase in the 
probability of default.  
Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation (1) instead for attrition, again focusing 
on the relationship measures. (For brevity, the non-relationship results are left to the appendix.) 
In general the pattern of the relationship results is qualitatively similar to that in Table 2 (and so 
our discussion of them will be brief). That is, the same relationship information that is associated 
with lower default rates is also generally associated with lower attrition rates. 
For example, using the baseline measure R1, relationship accounts have on average a 
12% lower probability of attrition than non-relationship accounts, ceteris paribus. This result is 
statistically and economically significant. The effect on attrition is again monotonic with the 
number of relationships (R2), ranging from a 3% decline in attrition probability for the first 
relationship to a 21% decline for the sixth relationship. The effect is significant for all of the 
relationship types (R3 and R4), especially investment and deposit relationships. The probability 
of attrition significantly declines with the length of the relationships (R5). The (negative) effect 
of relationships on attrition is stronger with proximity (R6). Larger relationship balances (R7 and 
R12) and increases in relationship balances (R9) are also associated with lower attrition rates, but 
more (and increased) volatility in the balances is associated with higher attrition rates (R10 and 
R11). Under R13, balance transfers from checking (i.e., saving) are associated with lower 
attrition, but transfers to checking (i.e., dissaving) are associated with higher attrition, with the 
marginal effect being larger for the latter.    19
In sum, across the entire rich array of relationship measures that we have considered, 
including the dynamic measures, relationship accounts have lower probabilities of default and 
attrition, ceteris paribus. 
 
3.2  Relationship Banking and Credit Card Utilization  
3.2.1 Methodology     
In this section we consider the implications of relationships on a standard measure of 
account usage, the account utilization rate (i.e., account balances relative to the account limit). 
For consistency, we generally use the same covariates as in equation (1), but replace the 
dependent variable Yi,t with the utilization rate of account i in month t.
13 We estimate by OLS, 
allowing for heteroscedasticity across accounts and serial correlation within accounts. 
3.2.2  Results   
We begin by briefly noting some of the results for the non-relationship variables, which 
appear in Appendix Table 3 for the baseline specification using R1. Higher credit scores are 
correlated with lower utilization rates. This is not surprising, since the scores are known to take 
utilization into account negatively. Credit balances (total bankcard, non-bankcard, home equity 
line, mortgage and auto balances, with the exception of student loan balances) come in with 
significant negative coefficients, suggesting some substitutability with balances on the sample 
credit cards, though the magnitudes of the effects are small. Higher unemployment is associated 
with significantly greater utilization, though higher house price growth (and higher income) is 
also associated with significantly greater utilization, which is indicative of a wealth effect. The 
                                                           
13 Unlike equation (1), we exclude the account limit, debt, payment and purchase amounts as independent variables, 
since they are closely related to the dependent variable.    20
effect of house prices is substantial: Each percentage point increase in house price growth is 
associated with a 2.4 percentage point (p.p.) increase in the utilization rate.
14  
 
Table 4 reports the results for the relationship variables. The coefficient on relationship 
measure R1 is significantly positive. Hence relationship accounts have higher utilization rates 
than non-relationship accounts, ceteris paribus. Relative to an average utilization rate of about 20 
p.p., the average difference of 7 p.p. is substantial.
15 Using measure R2, utilization significantly 
and monotonically increases with the number of relationships. The utilization rate is 2 p.p. higher 
for accounts with one other relationship, and 14 p.p. higher for accounts with at least six 
relationships. Under measures R3 and R4, utilization increases with each type of relationship, 
especially checking and brokerage relationships (by about 9 p.p.). Under R5, utilization also 
increases with the length of each type of relationship.    
  Under R6, interacting the relationship indicator (R1) with the indicator for proximity 
leads to a significant positive coefficient. Thus the effect of relationships on utilization is larger 
when account-holders live near a bank branch.  
Using R7, the coefficients on relationship balances are significantly positive. Hence, 
given total balances, larger shares of balances at the bank are associated with greater usage of the 
credit card from the bank. Using R9, changes in relationship balances also generally have 
positive effects. The notable exception is that an increase in Heloc balances has a significant 
negative effect. This is consistent with a degree of substitutability between home equity lines of 
                                                           
14 This result, as well as the results for the other variables in the table, is similar using debt normalized by the limit 
as the dependent variable.  
15 The conclusion is the same using debt normalized by the limit as the dependent variable, even though 
unconditionally relationship accounts have lower debt and higher limits than non-relationship accounts. For debt, the 
coefficient on R1 is accordingly somewhat smaller at .033, but still statistically and economically significant.    21
credit and credit card lines of credit. Under R10 and R11, higher (and increased) volatility of 
balances is associated with lower utilization.  
Under R12, given the level of checking balances (R7), the indicator for low balances is 
not significant. However, under R13, transfers of balances to checking from other accounts (in 
particular savings and investment accounts, i.e., dissaving) are associated with significantly 
higher credit card utilization, by about 10 p.p. on average. Conversely, transfers from checking 
to the other accounts (i.e., saving) are associated with significantly lower utilization, by about 8 
p.p. on average. These results are suggestive of the arrival of negative and positive shocks, 
respectively, consistent with the previous results for R13 for default and attrition. More 
generally, the various results regarding checking relationships imply that dynamic information 
from checking accounts in particular can be useful in the ongoing monitoring of loans. Changes 
in the behavior of checking accounts can provide indirect information about shocks and other 
factors that otherwise are hard for a bank to observe directly.  
 
4.   Conclusion 
  This study provided direct evidence of the potential benefits of relationship banking to 
retail banks. The results indicate that, even controlling for traditional sources of bank 
information (both public information and private, within-account information) and other 
variables, credit card account-holders with other relationships at a bank tend to have higher 
utilization rates yet lower default and attrition rates. In particular, dynamic information about 
changes in the behavior of an account-holder’s other relationships helps predict the behavior of 
the credit card account over time. This is consistent with the view that, among the various   22
potential benefits of relationship banking, relationships can help banks better monitor their loans 
over time. 
These results imply that relationship information is valuable in a predictive sense, but 
how exactly banks should use this information requires additional considerations. The optimal 
use of information and optimal contract design, both from the point of view of the bank and 
socially, is an important but difficult question that is beyond the scope of this paper. First, banks 
need to consider how consumers and their competitors would respond to the use of the 
information. Second, government policies can restrict certain uses of information, including 
cross-account information. In addition to considering the benefits of such restrictions, a 
comprehensive analysis of such policies should also consider the potential efficiency loss from 
excluding information that is predictive.  
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 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
Unemployment rate (%) 5.3 0.9 5.2 0.8
% w/o health insurance 12.5 3.7 12.7 3.3
House prices % 7.3 0.8 7.4 0.9
State income ($1000) 36.083 4.588 36.428 4.507
Application income 41.074 12.627 44.123 16.029
Wealth = low 32%   27%  
                  = medium 57%   55%  
            = high 11%   17%  
External Risk Score 735 71 743 66
Internal Risk Score 716 46 720 33
Debt 1.979 3.912 1.836 3.238
Payments 0.308 0.774 0.389 0.903
Purchase 0.229 0.923 0.274 0.669
APR 16.99 5.46 15.50 5.08
Credit line  8.283 3.737 9.491 3.804
Total number of bankcards 6656
 Total bankcard credit limits 27.984 24.902 23.027 27.639
Total bankcard balances 7.023 14.066 7.569 17.122
Total number of non-bank cards 11 10 13 14
Total non-bank card balances 18.553 9.324 16.103 7.975
Total home equity line limits 7.394 28.922 5.866 25.241
Total home equity line balance 4.857 18.651 3.909 14.074
Total mortgage loan balance 43 092 81 893 44 745 87 208
Non-Relationship Accounts Relationship Accounts
Total mortgage loan balance 43.092 81.893 44.745 87.208
Total auto loan balance 3.377 6.098 2.891 6.544
Total student loan balance 1.183 6.893 1.115 7.696
Default % 5.6% 3.9%
Attrition % 15.5% 12.0%
Utilization rate 0.188 0.239
Number of Accounts 40944 43.7% 52750 56.3%
Notes:
Values are averaged over the sample period. Dollar amounts in $1000 units.
(Default and attrition rates are total rates over the sample period.)Table 2: Implications of Relationships for Default   
Default
Variable Coeff Std Err P-value Marg Eff
R 1. Relationship 
Relationship Indicator -0.3208 0.0859 <.0001 10.1%
R 2. Breadth of  Relationships
Number of Bank Relationships=1 -0.2628 0.0356 <.0001 1.6%
 =2 -0.2307 0.0416 <.0001 3.1%
 =3 -0.3258 0.1270 <.0001 6.3%
 =4 -0.2539 0.1221 <.0001 9.4%
 =5 -0.6404 0.3151 <.0001 10.6%
 =6+ -0.6253 0.2465 <.0001 17.9%
R 3. Type of Relationships (Broad)
Deposit Relationships -0.2410 0.0672 <.0001 9.3%
Investment Relationship -0.3366 0.1199 <.0001 14.1%
Loan Relationship -0.0303 0.0129 <.0001 4.2%
R 4. Type of Relationships (Narrow)
Checking Dummy -0.1217 0.0391 <.0001 6.6%
Savings Dummy -0.2743 0.0697 <.0001 8.0%
Brokerage Dummy -0.2534 0.0891 <.0001 10.5%
CD Dummy -0.4579 0.1237 <.0001 16.6%
Mutual Fund Dummy -0.3714 0.0320 <.0001 14.9%
Home Equity Line Dummy -0.0162 0.0047 <.0001 7.4%
Home Equity Loan Dummy -0.0107 0.0047 <.0001 2.8%
Mortgage Loan Dummy -0.0167 0.0052 <.0001 3.6%
R 5. Length of Relationships
Age of Checking Relationship -0.0013 0.0002 <.0001 3.4% Age of Checking Relationship 0.0013 0.0002 .0001 3.4%
Age of Savings Rel -0.0061 0.0004 <.0001 5.8%
Age of Brokerage Rel -0.0108 0.0009 <.0001 9.8%
Age of CD Rel -0.0213 0.0054 <.0001 13.2%
Age of Mutual Fund Rel -0.0163 0.0015 <.0001 6.3%
Age of Home Equity Line Rel -0.0009 0.0009 <.0001 11.5%
Age of Home Equity Loan Rel -0.0018 0.0009 <.0001 9.4%
Age of Mortgage Loan Rel -0.0059 0.0021 <.0001 10.0%
R 6. Proximity of Relationship
Relationship Indicator -0.3041 0.0812 0.000 6.0%
State with Branch Indicator -0.2728 0.0762 <.0001 7.6%
Relationship * Branch State -0.1231 0.0510 <.0001 3.0%
 
 Table 2: Implications of Relationships for Default  (ctd)   
Default
Variable Coeff Std Err P-value Marg Eff
R 7. Depth of Relationships  (ln(Bal) & R4)
Checking Balance -0.0612 0.0139 <.0001 13.2%
Savings Balance -0.0731 0.0188 <.0001 7.2%
CD Balance -0.0780 0.0210 <.0001 10.6%
Mutual Fund Balance -0.1806 0.0433 <.0001 19.8%
Home Equity Line Balance -0.1173 0.0333 <.0001 3.1%
Home Equity Loan Balance -0.0817 0.0344 <.0001 5.8%
Mortgage Loan Balance -0.1984 0.0776 <.0001 3.3%
R 8. Combined Relationship Measures
Number of Bank Relationships=1 -0.2551 0.0354 <.0001 0.1%
 =2 -0.2292 0.0409 <.0001 1.8%
 =3 -0.3129 0.1262 <.0001 4.7%
 =4 -0.2453 0.1200 <.0001 7.0%
 =5 -0.6307 0.3054 <.0001 10.1%
 =6+ -0.6189 0.2458 <.0001 17.0%
Checking Dummy -0.1169 0.0376 <.0001 4.3%
Savings Dummy -0.2573 0.0649 <.0001 5.3%
Brokerage Dummy -0.2417 0.0840 <.0001 7.8%
CD Dummy -0.4231 0.1195 <.0001 13.1%
Mutual Fund Dummy -0.3658 0.0308 <.0001 11.7%
Home Equity Line Dummy -0.0150 0.0045 <.0001 4.2%
Home Equity Loan Dummy -0.0098 0.0045 <.0001 0.5%
Mortgage Loan Dummy -0.0160 0.0048 <.0001 0.7%
Age of Checking Relationship -0.0012 0.0002 <.0001 2.6%
Age of Savings Rel -0.0059 0.0004 <.0001 5.1% Age of Savings Rel 0.0059 0.0004 .0001 5.1%
Age of Brokerage Rel -0.0108 0.0009 <.0001 8.9%
Age of CD Rel -0.0212 0.0052 <.0001 11.7%
Age of Mutual Fund Rel -0.0156 0.0015 <.0001 6.2%
Age of Home Equity Line Rel -0.0009 0.0009 <.0001 11.0%
Age of Home Equity Loan Rel -0.0017 0.0008 <.0001 8.6%
Age of Mortgage Loan Rel -0.0058 0.0021 <.0001 8.8%
State with Branch Indicator -0.2674 0.0749 <.0001 3.0%
Relationship * Branch State -0.1222 0.0507 <.0001 1.8%
Checking Balance -0.0604 0.0137 <.0001 12.5%
Savings Balance -0.0720 0.0182 <.0001 5.7%
CD Balance -0.0749 0.0208 <.0001 9.0%
Mutual Fund Balance -0.1767 0.0421 <.0001 18.4%
Home Equity Line Balance -0.1147 0.0327 <.0001 4.0%
Home Equity Loan Balance -0.0788 0.0339 <.0001 4.2%
Mortgage Loan Balance -0.1974 0.0756 <.0001 2.1%
 
 Table 2: Implications of Relationships for Default  (ctd) 
Default
Variable Coeff Std Err P-value Marg Eff
R 9. Change in Balances (ln(Bal) & R7 & R4)
D(Checking Balance) -0.0307 0.0032 <.0001 6.1%
D(Savings Balance) -0.0285 0.0011 <.0001 13.0%
D(Mutual Fund Balance) -0.0655 0.0014 <.0001 10.0%
D(Home Equity Line Balance) -0.0042 0.0015 0.0002 6.5%
D(External Score) -0.4479 0.0262 <.0001 16.0%
D(Internal Score) -0.3854 0.0683 <.0001 12.3%
R 10. Volatility of Balances (sd(12) & R7 & R4)
sd(Checking Balance) 1.1014 0.0209 <.0001 5.2%
sd(Savings Balance) 0.7945 0.0616 <.0001 11.9%
sd(Mutual Fund Balance) 1.2133 0.0638 <.0001 10.2%
sd(Home Equity Line Balance) 1.1366 0.0867 <.0001 11.3%
sd(External Score) 0.7706 0.2233 <.0001 13.1%
sd(Internal Score) 0.4569 0.2118 <.0001 7.5%
R 11. Change in Volatility ( D(sd(6)) & R7 & R4)
D(sd(Checking Balance)) 1.0136 0.0227 <.0001 6.8%
D(sd(Savings Balance)) 0.5563 0.0509 <.0001 12.9%
D(sd(Mutual Fund Balance)) 0.9448 0.0669 <.0001 11.3%
D(sd(Home Equity Line Balance)) 0.9608 0.0733 <.0001 13.5%
D(sd(External Score)) 0.5999 0.2104 <.0001 14.9%
D(sd(Internal Score)) 0.5903 0.2174 <.0001 8.8%
R 12. Low Checking Balances (& R7 & R4)
Indicator(Balance < $2000) 0.6999 0.1675 <.0001 12.7%
R 13. Transfers of Balances (&R7 & R4)
To Checking 0.5954 0.1953 <.0001 12.8% To Checking 0.5954 0.1953 .0001 12.8%
From Checking -0.7100 0.1918 <.0001 3.2%
Number of Obs / Number Default   1132182 4322  
Notes: This table shows the effects of relationships in predicting credit card default 
(bankruptcy or three months delinquency), using Cox proportional hazard models following 
eq. (1). The explanatory variables include macro-demographic, loan-performance, credit-
bureau, and relationship variables, in addition to month and state dummies. The table 
reports only the results for the relationship variables; each panel represents a separate 
specification. (The other variables appear in the appendix for specification R1.) In the first 
panel, R1 is a dummy variable identifying credit card accounts that have another 
relationship. R2 uses dummy variables for the number of relationships (relationship 
breadth). R3 and R4  uses dummy variables identifying the types of relationships, broadly 
and narrowly defined. R5 measures the length of the relationships (age in months since 
opening). R6 uses dummy variables to distinguish account-holders that have a relationship 
and reside close to bank branches (i.e., reside in states with bank branches). R7 measures 
the balances of the relationship categories (relationship depth, using ln(balances +1)), and 
R9 measures the changes in the balances. R10 measures the volatility of balances over the 
prior 12 months, and R11 measures the change in the volatility of balances over the prior 
two 6-month periods. R12 uses a dummy variable for whether checking balances have 
fallen below $2000. R13 uses dummy variables for whether there were matching balance 
transfers between the checking account and the other accounts. The standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity across accounts and serial correlation within accounts. The 
marginal effects for continuous covariates show the effects of a one standard-deviation 
change in the covariates.Table 3: Implications of Relationships for Attrition 
Attrition
Variable Coeff Std Err P-value Marg Eff
R 1. Relationship 
Relationship Indicator -0.5607 0.0950 <.0001 11.6%
R 2. Breadth of  Relationships  
Number of Bank Relationships=1 -0.8552 0.0764 <.0001 3.2%
 =2 -0.7798 0.0696 <.0001 3.8%
 =3 -0.7196 0.0807 <.0001 10.6%
 =4 -0.9266 0.0968 <.0001 14.6%
 =5 -0.9731 0.1146 <.0001 18.4%
 =6+ -0.6895 0.0799 <.0001 21.4%
R 3. Type of Relationships (Broad)
Deposit Relationships -0.1067 0.0474 <.0001 11.3%
Investment Relationship -0.2889 0.0396 <.0001 13.3%
Loan Relationship -0.2457 0.1294 <.0001 7.8%
R 4. Type of Relationships (Narrow)
Checking Dummy -0.1537 0.0295 <.0001 10.3%
Savings Dummy -0.1251 0.0500 <.0001 6.4%
Brokerage Dummy -0.6333 0.0759 <.0001 2.4%
CD Dummy -0.2469 0.0764 <.0001 5.7%
Mutual Fund Dummy -0.1103 0.0698 <.0001 12.6%
Home Equity Line Dummy -0.2772 0.1006 <.0001 5.0%
Home Equity Loan Dummy -0.2178 0.0623 <.0001 2.1%
Mortgage Loan Dummy -0.2079 0.1172 <.0001 1.2%
R 5. Length of Relationships
Age of Checking Relationship -0.0004 0.0002 <.0001 5.0% Age of Checking Relationship 0.0004 0.0002 .0001 5.0%
Age of Savings Rel -0.0005 0.0003 <.0001 5.9%
Age of Brokerage Rel -0.0064 0.0016 <.0001 5.5%
Age of CD Rel -0.0009 0.0002 <.0001 1.7%
Age of Mutual Fund Rel -0.0008 0.0002 <.0001 4.9%
Age of Home Equity Line Rel -0.0014 0.0001 <.0001 3.5%
Age of Home Equity Loan Rel -0.0015 0.0002 <.0001 1.7%
Age of Mortgage Loan Rel -0.0021 0.0009 <.0001 0.9%
R 6. Proximity of Relationship
Relationship Indicator -0.8123 0.0539 <.0001 9.4%
State with Branch Indicator -0.9686 0.0805 <.0001 3.7%
Relationship * Branch State -0.8668 0.1056 <.0001 2.1%Table 3: Implications of Relationships for Attrition (ctd)
Attrition
Variable Coeff Std Err P-value Marg Eff
R 7. Depth of Relationships  (ln (Bal+$1) & R4)
Checking Balance -0.0242 0.0101 <.0001 9.3%
Savings Balance -0.0392 0.0140 <.0001 6.5%
CD Balance -0.0601 0.0159 <.0001 5.1%
Mutual Fund Balance -0.0506 0.0283 <.0001 5.9%
Home Equity Line Balance -0.0187 0.0210 <.0001 6.9%
Home Equity Loan Balance -0.0724 0.0497 <.0001 5.8%
Mortgage Loan Balance -0.1596 0.2396 <.0001 1.4%
R 8. Combined Relationship Measures
Number of Bank Relationships=1 -0.8500 0.0755 <.0001 1.8%
 =2 -0.7809 0.0693 <.0001 2.0%
 =3 -0.7103 0.0806 <.0001 9.6%
 =4 -0.9212 0.0952 <.0001 13.9%
 =5 -0.9648 0.1138 <.0001 18.2%
 =6+ -0.6864 0.0796 <.0001 20.5%
Checking Dummy -0.1535 0.0292 <.0001 8.2%
Savings Dummy -0.1246 0.0499 <.0001 5.9%
Brokerage Dummy -0.6256 0.0756 <.0001 1.7%
CD Dummy -0.2458 0.0751 <.0001 5.3%
Mutual Fund Dummy -0.1103 0.0687 <.0001 11.8%
Home Equity Line Dummy -0.2722 0.1005 <.0001 4.9%
Home Equity Loan Dummy -0.2146 0.0620 <.0001 1.0%
Mortgage Loan Dummy -0.2070 0.1162 <.0001 0.6%
Age of Checking Relationship -0.0004 0.0002 <.0001 3.6%
Age of Savings Rel -0.0005 0.0003 <.0001 4.7% Age of Savings Rel 0.0005 0.0003 .0001 4.7%
Age of Brokerage Rel -0.0064 0.0016 <.0001 4.1%
Age of CD Rel -0.0009 0.0002 <.0001 0.9%
Age of Mutual Fund Rel -0.0008 0.0002 <.0001 3.2%
Age of Home Equity Line Rel -0.0014 0.0001 <.0001 1.6%
Age of Home Equity Loan Rel -0.0015 0.0002 <.0001 0.9%
Age of Mortgage Loan Rel -0.0020 0.0009 <.0001 0.1%
State with Branch Indicator -0.9645 0.0798 <.0001 2.9%
Relationship * Branch State -0.8644 0.1034 <.0001 1.4%
Checking Balance -0.0240 0.0100 <.0001 8.8%
Savings Balance -0.0391 0.0139 <.0001 5.5%
CD Balance -0.0595 0.0158 <.0001 5.0%
Mutual Fund Balance -0.0497 0.0278 <.0001 5.5%
Home Equity Line Balance -0.0184 0.0209 <.0001 5.5%
Home Equity Loan Balance -0.0720 0.0495 <.0001 5.6%
Mortgage Loan Balance -0.1565 0.2358 <.0001 1.1%Table 3: Implications of Relationships for Attrition (ctd)
Attrition
Variable Coeff Std Err P-value Marg Eff
R 9. Change in Balances (ln(Bal) & R7 & R4)
D(Checking Balance) -0.6195 0.0552 <.0001 5.3%
D(Savings Balance) -0.3557 0.0018 <.0001 5.8%
D(Mutual Fund Balance) -0.4797 0.1071 <.0001 2.1%
D(Home Equity Line Balance) -0.1510 0.0057 <.0001 2.5%
D(External Score) -0.8771 0.2081 <.0001 13.5%
D(Internal Score) -0.4872 0.2255 <.0001 14.5%
R 10. Volatility of Balances (sd(12) & R7 & R4)
sd(Checking Balance) 0.8699 0.1779 <.0001 12.4%
sd(Savings Balance) 0.3015 0.0512 <.0001 3.8%
sd(Mutual Fund Balance) 0.8418 0.2345 <.0001 3.1%
sd(Home Equity Line Balance) 0.4405 0.1275 <.0001 8.7%
sd(External Score) 0.7632 0.2051 <.0001 10.9%
sd(Internal Score) 0.7232 0.3451 <.0001 16.9%
R 11. Change in Volatility ( D(sd(6)) & R7 & R4)
D(sd(Checking Balance)) 0.4981 0.0454 <.0001 5.2%
D(sd(Savings Balance)) 0.4849 0.1062 <.0001 14.4%
D(sd(Mutual Fund Balance)) 0.7144 0.2951 <.0001 11.7%
D(sd(Home Equity Line Balance)) 0.7132 0.1934 <.0001 11.9%
D(sd(External Score)) 0.8707 0.1991 <.0001 16.4%
D(sd(Internal Score)) 0.9569 0.0943 <.0001 12.8%
R 12. Low Checking Balances (& R7 & R4)
Indicator(Balance < $2000) 0.5386 0.1412 <.0001 13.0%
R 13. Transfers of Balances (&R7 & R4)
To Checking 0.5262 0.2624 <.0001 14.9% To Checking 0.5262 0.2624 .0001 14.9%
From Checking -0.9530 0.3027 <.0001 3.2%
Number of Obs / Number Attrition 1132182 12649  
Notes: This table shows the effects of relationships in predicting credit card attrition, 
using Cox proportional hazard models following eq. (1). The explanatory variables 
include macro-demographic, loan-performance, credit-bureau, and relationship 
variables, in addition to month and state dummies. The table reports only the results 
for the relationship variables; each panel represents a separate specification. (The 
other variables appear in the appendix for specification R1.) The relationship 
variables are defined in Table 2. The standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity across accounts and serial correlation within accounts. The 
marginal effects for continuous covariates show the effects of a one standard-
deviation change in the covariates.Table 4: Implications of Relationships for Utilization
Utilization Rate
Variable Coeff Std Err P-value
R 1. Relationship 
Relationship Indicator 0.0680 0.0109 <.0001
R 2. Breadth of  Relationships
Number of Bank Relationships=1 0.0241 0.0027 <.0001
 =2 0.0292 0.0029 <.0001
 =3 0.0517 0.0029 <.0001
 =4 0.0690 0.0030 <.0001
 =5 0.0954 0.0031 <.0001
 =6+ 0.1378 0.0031 <.0001
R 3. Type of Relationships (Broad)
Deposit Relationships 0.0730 0.0012 <.0001
Investment Relationship 0.1032 0.0011 <.0001
Loan Relationship 0.0324 0.0073 <.0001
R 4. Type of Relationships (Narrow)
Checking Dummy 0.0931 0.0011 <.0001
Savings Dummy 0.0576 0.0013 <.0001
Brokerage Dummy 0.0930 0.0025 <.0001
CD Dummy 0.0755 0.0017 <.0001
Mutual Fund Dummy 0.0297 0.0027 <.0001
Home Equity Line Dummy 0.0484 0.0026 <.0001
Home Equity Loan Dummy 0.0334 0.0030 <.0001
Mortgage Loan Dummy 0.0373 0.0089 <.0001
R 5. Length of Relationships
Age of Checking Relationship 0.0002 0.0000 <.0001 Age of Checking Relationship 0.0002 0.0000 .0001
Age of Savings Rel 0.0003 0.0000 <.0001
Age of Brokerage Rel 0.0007 0.0000 <.0001
Age of CD Rel 0.0001 0.0000 <.0001
Age of Mutual Fund Rel 0.0009 0.0000 <.0001
Age of Home Equity Line Rel 0.0007 0.0000 <.0001
Age of Home Equity Loan Rel 0.0001 0.0001 <.0001
Age of Mortgage Loan Rel 0.0003 0.0001 <.0001
R 6. Proximity of Relationship
Relationship Indicator 0.0530 0.0113 <.0001
State with Branch Indicator 0.0458 0.0033 <.0001
Relationship * Branch State 0.0455 0.0035 <.0001Table 4: Implications of Relationships for Utilization (ctd)
Utilization Rate
Variable Coeff Std Err P-value
R 7. Depth of Relationships  (ln (Bal+$1) & R4)
Checking Balance 0.0341 0.0004 <.0001
Savings Balance 0.0822 0.0005 <.0001
CD Balance 0.0231 0.0005 <.0001
Mutual Fund Balance 0.0231 0.0007 <.0001
Home Equity Line Balance 0.0594 0.0007 <.0001
Home Equity Loan Balance 0.0138 0.0023 <.0001
Mortgage Loan Balance 0.0652 0.0080 <.0001
R 8. Combined Relationship Measures
Number of Bank Relationships=1 0.0230 0.0026 <.0001
 =2 0.0290 0.0027 <.0001
 =3 0.0490 0.0028 <.0001
 =4 0.0662 0.0028 <.0001
 =5 0.0935 0.0030 <.0001
 =6+ 0.1368 0.0029 <.0001
Checking Dummy 0.0910 0.0011 <.0001
Savings Dummy 0.0563 0.0013 <.0001
Brokerage Dummy 0.0871 0.0024 <.0001
CD Dummy 0.0722 0.0016 <.0001
Mutual Fund Dummy 0.0289 0.0025 <.0001
Home Equity Line Dummy 0.0462 0.0025 <.0001
Home Equity Loan Dummy 0.0318 0.0029 <.0001
Mortgage Loan Dummy 0.0349 0.0087 <.0001
Age of Checking Relationship 0.0002 0.0000 <.0001
Age of Savings Rel 0.0003 0.0000 <.0001 Age of Savings Rel 0.0003 0.0000 .0001
Age of Brokerage Rel 0.0007 0.0000 <.0001
Age of CD Rel 0.0001 0.0000 <.0001
Age of Mutual Fund Rel 0.0009 0.0000 <.0001
Age of Home Equity Line Rel 0.0006 0.0000 <.0001
Age of Home Equity Loan Rel 0.0001 0.0001 <.0001
Age of Mortgage Loan Rel 0.0003 0.0001 <.0001
State with Branch Indicator 0.0456 0.0031 <.0001
Relationship * Branch State 0.0436 0.0033 <.0001
Checking Balance 0.0331 0.0004 <.0001
Savings Balance 0.0824 0.0005 <.0001
CD Balance 0.0228 0.0005 <.0001
Mutual Fund Balance 0.0225 0.0007 <.0001
Home Equity Line Balance 0.0573 0.0006 <.0001
Home Equity Loan Balance 0.0140 0.0022 <.0001
Mortgage Loan Balance 0.0636 0.0080 <.0001Table 4: Implications of Relationships for Utilization (ctd)
Utilization Rate
Variable Coeff Std Err P-value
R 9. Change in Balances (ln(Bal) & R7 & R4)
D(Checking Balance) 0.0185 0.0000 <.0001
D(Savings Balance) 0.0162 0.0001 <.0001
D(Mutual Fund Balance) 0.0029 0.0003 <.0001
D(Home Equity Line Balance) -0.0175 0.0001 <.0001
D(External Score) 0.0178 0.0089 <.0001
D(Internal Score) 0.0200 0.0077 <.0001
R 10. Volatility of Balances (sd(12) & R7 & R4)
sd(Checking Balance) -0.0157 0.0018 <.0001
sd(Savings Balance) -0.0338 0.0023 <.0001
sd(Mutual Fund Balance) -0.0631 0.0009 <.0001
sd(Home Equity Line Balance) -0.0240 0.0051 <.0001
sd(External Score) -0.0161 0.0001 <.0001
sd(Internal Score) -0.0560 0.0243 <.0001
R 11. Change in Volatility ( D(sd(6)) & R7 & R4)
D(sd(Checking Balance)) -0.0004 0.0001 <.0001
D(sd(Savings Balance)) -0.0002 0.0003 <.0001
D(sd(Mutual Fund Balance)) -0.0030 0.0002 <.0001
D(sd(Home Equity Line Balance)) -0.0004 0.0000 <.0001
D(sd(External Score)) -0.0012 0.0015 <.0001
D(sd(Internal Score)) -0.0007 0.0001 <.0001
R 12. Low Checking Balances (& R7 & R4)
Indicator(Balance < $2000) -0.0567 0.0590 0.8322
R 13. Transfers of Balances (&R7 & R4)
To Checking 0.0958 0.0240 <.0001 To Checking 0.0958 0.0240 .0001
From Checking -0.0812 0.0382 <.0001
Number of Obs  1132182    
Notes: This table shows the effects of relationships on credit card 
utilization rates (balances/limit), estimating eq. (1) by OLS. The 
explanatory variables include macro-demographic, loan-performance, 
credit-bureau, and relationship variables, in addition to month and state 
dummies. The table reports only the results for the relationship variables; 
each panel represents a separate specification. (The other variables 
appear in the appendix for specification R1.) The relationship variables are 
defined in Table 2. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
across accounts and serial correlation within accounts.   
Appendix Table 1: Baseline Results for Default Appendix Table 1: Baseline Results for Default  
Default
Variable Coeff Std Err P-value Marg Eff
 
External Risk Score -0.0041 0.0002 <.0001 14.6%
Internal Risk Score -0.0055 0.0002 <.0001 16.3%
Debt 0 3479 0 0129 < 0001 16 % Debt 0.3479 0.0129 <.0001 1.6%
Purchase -0.0457 0.0354 0.2351 1.1%
Payments -0.1722 0.0124 <.0001 2.8%
Credit line  -0.2880 0.0134 <.0001 4.8%
APR 0.0385 0.0050 <.0001 0.7%
Total number of bankcards 0.0625 0.0082 <.0001 2.5%
 Total bankcard credit limits -0.0032 0.0106 0.7139 4.7%
Total bankcard balances 0 1441 0 0364 < 0001 34 % Total bankcard balances 0.1441 0.0364 <.0001 3.4%
Total number of non-bank cards 0.0070 0.0027 0.0224 0.4%
Total non-bank card balances 0.0553 0.0156 <.0001 1.1%
Total home equity line limits -0.0032 0.0018 0.0474 3.5%
Total home equity line balance 0.1222 0.0469 <.0001 1.8%
Total mortgage loan balance -0.0020 0.0004 <.0001 3.1%  
Total auto loan balance -0.0049 0.0032 0.1370 5.1%
Total student loan balance -0 0084 0 0043 0 0413 27 % Total student loan balance -0.0084 0.0043 0.0413 2.7%
Unemployment rate 0.5891 0.2780 0.0354 3.0%
% w/o health insurance -0.0290 0.0220 0.2246 2.9%
D(House prices) -0.3833 0.0398 <.0001 8.2%
State income -0.0842 0.0945 0.5916 3.8%
Application income -0.0486 0.0579 0.9271 2.7%
Application inc missing 0.1790 0.0427 <.0001 2.4%
Wealth = low 0.3277 0.2466 0.1023 1.2% Wealth = low 0.3277 0.2466 0.1023 1.2%
                  = medium 0.2703 0.3670 0.4606 2.0%
R1 = Any Relationship -0.3208 0.0859 <.0001 10.1%
State dummies Yes
Month dummies Yes
Number of Obs / Number Defaults   1132182 4322    
 
Notes: This table reports the results from Cox models of credit card default (bankruptcy or  Notes: This table reports the results from Cox models of credit card default (bankruptcy or 
three months delinquency), as a function of the explanatory variables in eq. (1): macro-
demographic, loan-performance, credit-bureau, and relationship variables, in addition to 
month and state dummies. The table reports the results for the baseline relationship measure 
R1, which is a dummy variable identifying credit card accounts that have another relationship. 
The standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across accounts and serial 
correlation within accounts. The marginal effects for continuous covariates show the effects 
of a one standard-deviation change in the covariates.Appendix Table 2: Baseline Results for Attrition Appendix Table 2: Baseline Results for Attrition  
Default
Variable Coeff Std Err P-value Marg Eff
 
External Risk Score 0.0033 0.0001 <.0001 8.7%
Internal Risk Score 0.0034 0.0003 <.0001 9.8%
Debt 0 0783 0 0065 < 0001 18 % Debt 0.0783 0.0065 <.0001 1.8%
Purchase -0.2904 0.0227 <.0001 4.5%
Payments 0.1245 0.0065 <.0001 1.8%
Credit line  0.0890 0.0061 <.0001 6.2%
APR 0.0483 0.0041 <.0001 8.4%
Total number of bankcards -0.0180 0.0086 <.0001 8.0%
 Total bankcard credit limits -0.0078 0.0012 <.0001 7.7%
Total bankcard balances -0 0013 0 0048 < 0001 40 % Total bankcard balances -0.0013 0.0048 <.0001 4.0%
Total number of non-bank cards 0.0180 0.0023 <.0001 0.4%
Total non-bank card balances -0.0322 0.0283 <.0001 2.5%
Total home equity line limits -0.0071 0.0087 0.9141 3.3%
Total home equity line balance -0.0033 0.0076 <.0001 2.7%
Total mortgage loan balance 0.0013 0.0023 <.0001 0.4%
Total auto loan balance 0.0020 0.0035 0.5291 3.1%
Total student loan balance -0 0031 0 0021 0 8290 46 % Total student loan balance -0.0031 0.0021 0.8290 4.6%
Unemployment rate -0.2604 0.7240 <.0001 5.5%
% w/o health insurance 0.0038 0.0133 0.7768 3.1%
D(House prices) -0.1427 0.0426 <.0001 4.7%
State income -0.0209 0.0550 0.9636 1.4%
Application income -0.0359 0.0645 0.9778 3.4%
Application inc missing 0.3041 0.1992 <.0001 0.7%
Wealth = low -0.1064 0.0476 0.0534 6.5% Wealth = low -0.1064 0.0476 0.0534 6.5%
                  = medium -0.1076 0.0674 0.1177 7.9%
R1 = Any Relationship -0.5607 0.0950 <.0001 11.6%
State dummies Yes
Month dummies Yes
Number of Obs / Number Attritions   1132182 12649    
Notes: This table reports the results from Cox models of credit card attrition, as a function  Notes: This table reports the results from Cox models of credit card attrition, as a function 
of the explanatory variables in eq. (1): macro-demographic, loan-performance, credit-
bureau, and relationship variables, in addition to month and state dummies. The table 
reports the results for the baseline relationship measure R1, which is a dummy variable 
identifying credit card accounts that have another relationship. The standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity across accounts and serial correlation within accounts. The 
marginal effects for continuous covariates show the effects of a one standard-deviation 
change in the covariates.Appendix Table 3: Baseline Results for Utilization
Default
Variable Coeff Std Err P-value
External Risk Score -0.0147 0.0043 <.0001
Internal Risk Score -0.0008 0.0000 <.0001
APR -0.0016 0.0000 <.0001
Total number of bankcards 0.0001 0.0000 0.0380
 Total bankcard credit limits 0.0223 0.0017 <.0001
Total bankcard balances -0.0005 0.0000 <.0001
Total number of non-bank cards -0.0016 0.0001 <.0001
Total non-bank card balances -0.0001 0.0000 <.0001
Total home equity line limits -0.0013 0.0001 <.0001
Total home equity line balance -0.0007 0.0000 <.0001
Total mortgage loan balance -0.0002 0.0001 <.0001
Total auto loan balance -0.0003 0.0001 <.0001
Total student loan balance 0.0014 0.0002 <.0001
Unemployment rate 0.0148 0.0015 <.0001
% w/o health insurance -0.0009 0.0000 0.0217
D(House prices) 0.0239 0.0064 <.0001
State income 0.0051 0.0012 <.0001
Al it i i 0 0032 0 0006 0001 Application income 0.0032 0.0006 <.0001
Application inc missing 0.0396 0.0045 <.0001
Wealth = low -0.0002 0.0014 0.8520
                  = medium -0.0019 0.0017 0.2200
R1 = Any Relationship 0.0680 0.0109 <.0001
cons 0.3198 0.0652 <.0001
State dummies Yes
Month dummies Yes
Number of Obs  1132182    
Notes: This table shows the results of estimating eq. (1) for credit card utilization rates 
(balances/limit), by OLS. The explanatory variables include macro-demographic, loan-
performance, credit-bureau, and relationship variables, in addition to month and state 
dummies. The table reports the results for the baseline relationship measure R1, which is a 
dummy variable identifying credit card accounts that have another relationship. The standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across accounts and serial correlation within 
accounts.1 
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